OSAC operator: Kubeconfig credential-plugin execution and SSRF in console proxy

Impact

The console-proxy's RemoteConfigResolver parses kubeconfig data from Kubernetes Secrets using clientcmd.RESTConfigFromKubeConfig without sanitizing the resulting rest.Config. A kubeconfig containing an exec plugin stanza (under users[].user.exec) is faithfully preserved. When rest.TransportFor later builds the HTTP transport for the upstream WebSocket connection, client-go invokes the exec plugin — spawning an arbitrary process as the osac-console-proxy service account.

This allows remote code execution inside the console-proxy pod for any principal that can create or modify a Secret with the label osac.openshift.io/remote-cluster-kubeconfig: "true" in a namespace where the console-proxy has Secret read access (governed by its RoleBinding). A secondary vector exists via attacker-controlled clusters[].server, enabling server-side request forgery (SSRF) from within the proxy pod.

Affected configurations: any deployment using remote or auto VM cluster mode (the default). Deployments using local mode exclusively are not affected, as they do not read kubeconfig Secrets.